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Background: Multiple principles are relevant in priority setting, two of which are often considered particularly
important. According to the greater benefit principle, resources should be directed toward the intervention with
the greater health benefit. This principle is intimately linked to the goal of health maximization and standard
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). According to the worse off principle, resources should be directed toward the
intervention benefiting those initially worse off. This principle is often linked to an idea of equity. Together, the two
principles accord with prioritarianism; a view which can motivate non-standard CEA. Crucial for the actual application
of prioritarianism is the trade-off between the two principles, and this trade-off has received scant attention when the
worse off are specified in terms of lifetime health. This paper sheds light on that specific trade-off and on the public
support for prioritarianism by providing fresh empirical evidence and by clarifying the close links between the findings
and normative theory.
Methods: A new, self-administered, computer-based questionnaire was used, to which 96 students in Norway
responded. How respondents wanted to balance quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained against benefiting those
with few lifetime QALYs was quantified for a range of different cases.
Results: Respondents supported both principles and were willing to make trade-offs in a particular way. In the baseline
case, the median response valued a QALY 3.3 and 2.5 times more when benefiting someone with lifetime QALYs of
10 and 25 rather than 70. Average responses harbored fundamental disagreements and varied modestly across
distributional settings.
Conclusion: In the specific context of lifetime health, the findings underscore the insufficiency of pure QALY
maximization and explicate how people make trade-offs in a way that can help operationalize lifetime prioritarianism
and non-standard CEA. Seen through the lens of normative theory, the findings highlight key challenges for
prioritarianism applied to priority setting.
Keywords: Priority setting, Prioritarianism, Cost-effectiveness, Equity weights, Quality-adjusted life years,
Political philosophy, Empirical ethicsBackground
Available resources typically fall short of health care needs,
making priority setting inevitable. Many priority-setting
principles, prescribing how resources should be allocated,
have been proposed. Of these, two general principles have
been particularly prominent, although terminology has
differed widely. According to the greater benefit principle,
also known as the principle of health maximization, re-
sources should be directed toward the intervention with* Correspondence: trygve.ottersen@igs.uib.no
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orthe greater health benefit. According to the worse off
principle, resources should be directed toward the inter-
vention benefiting those initially worse off, i.e., those worse
off without intervention. Either principle may have genuine
weight—and independently influence practical reasoning—
without necessarily outweighing all other considerations.
The greater benefit principle is blessed by an immediate
appeal and enjoys support in both public opinion [1,2] and
policy [3]. The principle is also intimately related to stand-
ard cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) [4]. Despite criticism,
the quality-adjusted life year (QALY) remains a popular
specification of benefit and a popular cost-effectivenessl Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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multiplying the number of years with a quality-adjustment
factor, scaled so that 0 represents death and 1 represents
“full” health. However, CEA with QALYs and the exclusive
pursuit of health maximization have been heavily criti-
cized, especially for making no direct reference to how
benefits are distributed or to the plight of the worse off
[7-12]. This feature is often considered fatal to the greater
benefit principle as a standalone one.
The worse off principle speaks directly to this central de-
ficiency of the greater benefit principle. Special priority to
the worse off—often made explicit by reference to “need,”
“severity,” or “urgency”—enjoys wide support in theory
[7,9,13,14], public opinion [11,15], and health policy [3,16].
However, there is an ongoing debate about how “severity”
and “the worse off” are best understood [9,16-18]. Accord-
ing to one reasonable specification, the worse off are those
with the fewer lifetime QALYs, i.e., those who will have the
fewer QALYs over their entire lifespan [7,16]. This com-
prehensive specification incorporates both quality and
quantity of health as well as past, present, and future health.
Assuming no uncertainty, lifetime QALYs can also be la-
beled quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE).
The worse off principle is also insufficient by itself, as it
makes no direct reference to benefits from intervention. A
compromise between the greater benefit principle and the
worse off principle is thus appealing because each principle
responds to the primary deficit of the other. This com-
promise accords with so-called prioritarianism, whose cen-
tral claim is that “[b]enefiting people matters more the
worse off these people are” [13]. Derek Parfit’s description
of how prioritarianism “contains the idea that benefits are
good” and “merely adds that benefits matter more the
worse off the people are who receive them” indicates how
prioritarianism can be seen as the compromise between
the greater benefit and the worse off principles [13].
While the greater benefit principle can motivate standard
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) with QALYs, prioritar-
ianism can motivate CEA with equity or distributional
weights [7,10,19,20]. These weights specify the importance
of health maximization relative to some other concern, for
example, that for the worse off. This other concern can be
integrated into CEA by multiplying the weights in ques-
tion with the original cost-effectiveness unit.
A crucial question for the operationalization of prioritar-
ianism is how its two inherent principles should be bal-
anced. This may be seen as a particular equity-efficiency
trade-off and to be at the center of multi-criteria decision
analysis [21]. The trade-off between greater benefits and
benefiting the worse off is often considered an object of
reasonable disagreement [14]. With no consensus on a
principled solution, the appropriate trade-off may be in-
formed by priority judgments of the general public [14,22].
The empirical study of such judgments—as with empiricalethics more generally—can provide input to individual
moral reasoning, public deliberation, and policy making
[14,22,23].
Only a few studies [24-26] have quantified how people
trade off QALYs gained against benefiting those with the
lower QALE per se, and these studies were limited in im-
portant respects. Two of them [24,25] covered only the
upper part of the QALE scale, and the third study [26] ad-
dressed the lower part only indirectly through rank or
relative position of the interventions’ target groups. This is
unfortunate because the lower part of the scale appears
particularly controversial and relates to a contentious as-
pect of lifetime QALY prioritarianism [16,27]. In addition,
two of the three studies [24,25] did not explore how aver-
age findings can harbor fundamentally opposed moral
views, and one studies did so only in little detail [26]. Such
deeply opposed views differ not only in how much more
or less priority they attribute to different target groups but
also in their ranking pattern, i.e., the very order of priority
among those groups. Fundamental disagreement of this
kind is not only interesting in its own right; it can also in-
form the proper use of aggregate data. Moreover, two of
the studies [25,26] did not provide respondents with the
distributional context of the interventions in question, i.e.,
the overall distribution of health in society, while the third
study [24] presented respondents with choices only be-
tween entire societies, each consisting of only two dif-
ferent groups. This is suboptimal given that normative
theory tends to stress the relevance of several aspects of
the background distribution [28-30].
The objective of the present study was to 1) develop and
test a new, comprehensive questionnaire; 2) assess people’s
support for lifetime QALY prioritarianism and quantify
how they trade off the greater benefit principle and the
worse off principle; and 3) examine the links between the
empirical findings and normative theory. With respect to
the trade-off, we specifically wanted to study trade-offs be-
tween QALYs gained and initial QALE across a wide range
of QALE levels, assess underlying ranking patterns, and
explore the relevance of distributional context.
Methods
A comprehensive, self-administered, computer-based ques-
tionnaire was developed and used to elicit priority judg-
ments from a convenience sample. The questionnaire was
distributed by email to an entire class of approximately
two hundred first-year medical and dental students in
Bergen, Norway, in 2008. No monetary reward was offered,
and ninety-six students responded. All respondents were
attending a course on medical ethics and had generally no
formal training in health economics or priority setting. In-
structions were provided both in the questionnaire and in
a preceding lecture. In both settings, emphasis was put on
explaining key technical concepts, including QALYs. An
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tire questionnaire (see Additional file 1).
Description and elicitation
Trade-offs were elicited using a common method, some-
times called “the gain trade-off technique” or “the bene-
fit trade-off technique”. Several aspects of this method
have been discussed theoretically [31,32], and variations
of it were employed in the three trade-off studies dis-
cussed above [24-26]. The basic idea is that the respond-
ent addresses pairs of interventions that vary in two
dimensions: total health benefits and the level of a par-
ticular attribute of the target group. Through a series of
binary choices or by direct question, the respondents
indicate what interventions they consider equally im-
portant. By comparing the health benefits of these two
interventions, we can infer how much benefit the re-
spondents are willing to sacrifice to advantage someone
with one rather than another level of the attribute in
question.
The part of the questionnaire reported here consisted of
one main task (task A) and four supplementary tasks
(tasks B to E). All tasks are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
In the main task, interventions were characterized by the
initial QALE of the target groups. The distribution of
QALE in the hypothetical society was represented by five
groups, each consisting of one fifth of the total population.
Their absolute levels of QALE were 10, 25, 40, 55, and 70,
respectively. These levels were chosen so as to cover a
wide range of QALE levels and make equal the absolute
difference between adjacent groups. Each intervention tar-
geted one of the five groups. The reference intervention
would provide, if implemented, a benefit of 10 QALYs to
every member of the group with an initial QALE of 70.
Respondents addressed four decision problems, each inFigure 1 A, B, C, D, and E panels representing tasks in the questionna
are indicated by dark and light grey bars, respectively.which they compared that reference intervention with an
alternative intervention. They were asked to state the
number of QALYs gained from the alternative interven-
tion that would make the two interventions equally im-
portant in terms of priority. In other words, respondents
indicated their indifference value for each of the four pair-
wise comparisons. Values permitted were 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,
and every integer between 1 and 99. Respondents were
specifically asked to adopt the perspective of a health plan-
ner concerned with doing what is best for society. More-
over, they were encouraged to assume that things other
than initial QALE and QALY benefits were equal. More
specifically, in the preceding lecture, respondents were
told that the benefits and the beneficiaries were equal in
all possible respects and examples were provided. In the
questionnaire, this was emphasized by making explicit that
the groups were of equal size, that the health benefits were
similar except for the target group, and that the costs were
the same. There were also repeated reminders that the
health benefits were otherwise equal.
Task B was similar to the main task in most respects.
The difference was that all the five interventions would
provide, if implemented, a benefit of 10 QALYs to every
member of their respective target group. Hence, there was
no benefit trade-off involved. Respondents were asked to
directly rank the interventions in order of what priority
they should have for implementation. Task B was included
to explore such direct rankings, as opposed to rankings
only implied by responses to the main task. Tasks of the
former kind are typically considered easier for the respon-
dents and may therefore produce more valid and reliable
information about ranking patterns than trade-off exer-
cises [33,34]. Task B was included also in order to compare
direct with implied rankings and thereby test intrares-
pondent consistency. Task B appeared at the end of theire. QALE without intervention and QALYs gained from intervention
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ginning. This latter task was included as a warm-up exer-
cise and to test the extent to which responses changed
during the exercise.
Task C was included in order to directly explore prior-
ity judgments with respect to the lower part of the
QALE scale. The difference from the main task was that
respondents directly compared the two groups with the
lowest initial QALE, i.e., those with an initial QALE of
10 and 25. This was done because their relative import-
ance indicated by such a task may differ from that in-
ferred from comparisons between each of those two
groups and the group with an initial QALE of 70. The
reference intervention in task C targeted the group with
an initial QALE of 25 and would provide, if imple-
mented, a benefit of 10 QALYs to every member of that
group. Respondents reported indifference values like in
the main task.
Tasks D and E were included to explore the relevance
of distributional context, i.e., the overall distribution of
health in society. Accordingly, the initial levels of QALE
across groups differed from the main task. In task D, initial
QALE levels were 50, 55, 60, 65, and 70, respectively.
Compared to the main task, this one involved a distribu-
tion with a higher average level of QALE and with smaller
absolute differences between groups. This distribution is
more representative for certain egalitarian societies, e.g.,
the Scandinavian countries, than the distribution in the
main task. In task E, initial QALE levels were 10, 55, 60,
65, and 70, respectively. Compared to the main task, the
worse off group here stands out more clearly. For ex-
ample, the absolute difference between that group and
the rest is much larger. Such a distribution can represent
populations in which the ratio between child and adult
mortality rates is particularly high, something that is char-
acteristic of several low-income countries. Respondents
reported their indifference values like in the main task.
Calculation of distributive weights
Distributive weights were calculated for the main task and
tasks C to E. For each pair-wise comparison, we took the
indifference value x to imply that the respondent was in-
different between providing 10 QALYs to someone at the
reference level of initial QALE and providing x QALYs to
someone at the alternative level. The distributional weight
for the alternative level can then be defined as the ratio
between the benefit in the reference case and the indif-
ference value x, i.e., 10/x [32,35]. In other words, the
distributional weight indicates how many times more im-
portant a QALY is when benefiting someone at that level.
While we here will follow most of the literature in taking
these weights as adequate approximations of marginal
weights, i.e., weights to be applied to the benefit of 1
QALY, marginal and nonmarginal weights can certainlydiffer [32]. Mean and median weights for every pair-wise
comparison were calculated from all responses that met
the inclusion criteria described below.
Analysis of ranking patterns
In contrast to sets of distributional weights, ranking pat-
terns only provide information about the order of priority.
Responses from tasks A and B were classified into ten
ranking patterns. These patterns describe how ranking
changes with initial QALE when seen from below and
with increasing rank, i.e., importance, along the y-axis.
They were labeled as follows: 1) monotonically decreasing;
2) monotonically increasing; 3) constant; 4) inverted-U
shape with peak at the second lowest group; 5) inverted-U
shape with peak at the middle group; 6) inverted-U shape
with peak at the second highest group; 7) U-shape with
base at the second lowest group; 8) U-shape with base at
the middle group; 9) U-shape with base at the second
highest group; and 10) other. Certain adaptations were
made, partly motivated by the fact that response options
between 1 and 99 in task A were limited to integers. If a
respondent gave two adjacent groups an equal rank, the
group with the highest ranked neighbor was classified as
the one with the higher rank. If the two groups were lo-
cated at one end of the QALE scale, the group at the very
end was classified as the one with the higher (lower) rank
if the middle group had a lower (higher) rank than the
two equally ranked groups.
As indicated, individual rankings were also used to as-
sess intrarespondent consistency. Responses to tasks A
and C to E were outright excluded for respondents who
ranked one group highest in task A and lowest in task B
or vice versa. Exception was made if that group shared
rank with three or more other groups. Tasks A and C to
E were also excluded for respondents who had not com-
pleted both task A and B, as consistency could not be
assessed. This was the case for 20 respondents. A given
task was considered complete only if all four interven-
tions had been ranked, directly or indirectly. In total, the
initial inclusion criteria for tasks A and C to E were met
for 66 respondents. The final inclusion of each particular
task also required that that specific task was complete.
For task B—which involved no trade-offs—no initial in-
clusion criteria had to be met, and it was sufficient that
that very task was complete. This was the case for 93
respondents.
Results
Figure 2 shows mean and median distributional weights
for different levels of initial QALE. Median (mean)
weights were 3.3 (2.0), 2.5 (2.0), 1.7 (1.6), 1.3 (1.4), and
1.0 (1.0) for initial QALE levels of 10, 25, 40, 55, and 70,
respectively. This indicates, among other things, that the
median response valued a QALY 3.3 or 2.5 times more
Figure 2 Mean and median distributional weights from the
main task (A).
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25 rather than 70. The median, as well as mean, distribu-
tional weights decrease monotonically with initial QALE.
In other words, for any two groups, a lower initial QALE
implies higher weight. To that extent, the sets of mean
and median responses correspond with prioritarianism.Rankings
Figure 3 shows the relative frequencies of different rank-
ing patterns in task B as well as in the main task (A).
While such patterns in task B follow from direct rank-
ings by the respondents, patterns in task A follow from
rankings implied by the respondents’ indifference values.
Most frequent was a monotonically decreasing pattern,
reported by 52% of the respondents in task B and 64%
in task A. Second most frequent was an inverted-U pat-
tern with peak at the second lowest group, reported by
20% and 6%, respectively. In both tasks, 12% of the re-
sponses did not fit any of the nine specific patterns and
were classified as “other”. As for Figure 3, illustrations of
nonmonotonic patterns need not represent the exactFigure 3 Relative frequencies of different ranking patterns in task B (internal relation between two groups located at opposite
sides of a peak or a base.
As described, 52% and 64% of the respondents reported
a monotonically decreasing pattern. This indicates not
only that the sets of mean and median distributional
weights accord with prioritarianism, but also that the ma-
jority of individual ranking patterns do. Nonetheless, the
many competing ranking patterns that were reported ex-
pose a fundamental conflict underlying the observed mean
and median weights. Not only was there division about
how much more weight the favored groups should have;
there was also a much deeper disagreement about what
groups should be favored at all. As suggested by the rela-
tive frequencies in Figure 3 and further discussed below,
the lower end of the QALE scale is the primary source of
this disagreement.
Given that the weights in Figure 2 are aggregates over
very different ranking patterns, it is interesting to also con-
sider mean and median weights among those who actually
reported a monotonically decreasing ranking pattern in
the main task. These sets of weights are shown in Figure 4.
Median (mean) weights were 5.0 (4.3), 2.9 (2.8), 1.7 (1.9),
1.4 (1.5), and 1.0 (1.0) for initial QALE levels of 10, 25, 40,
55, and 70, respectively. Compared to Figure 2, the cor-
responding weighting function is, not surprisingly, much
steeper.
In addition to task B, which appeared at the end of
questionnaire, respondents addressed an identical task in
the beginning. The change across the two tasks was
modest for the sample as a whole. The maximum abso-
lute change in relative frequency for any pattern was 2%.
At the individual level, however, 20% of the respondents
revised their ranking pattern.
Priority with respect to low levels
Priority judgments with respect to the lower and sup-
posedly most controversial part of the QALE scale were
examined in several ways. For the main task, the implied
mean and median distributional weights for an initial
QALE of 10, with 25 as the comparator, were 1.0 andand in task A in parentheses).
Figure 4 Mean and median distributional weights from the
main task (A) among respondents with weights monotonically
decreasing with initial QALE.
Ottersen et al. Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2014, 12:2 Page 6 of 10
http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/12/1/21.3, respectively. For the direct comparison in task C,
mean and median weights were both 1.3. Also with re-
spect to this lower part of the QALE scale, we explored
fundamental disagreements in terms of ordinal rank.
The proportion of respondents who gave some priority
to an initial QALE of 10 over 25 was 61% in task A, 47%
in task B, and 68% in task C. Equal priority was reported
by 17%, 14%, and 11% of the respondents, respectively.
Overall, these findings suggest that a majority of people
are prioritarians also with respect to the lower end of
the QALE scale, but the findings also suggest that the
disagreement on this issue is indeed substantial.
Impact of distributional context
Figure 5 shows how distributional weights for specific
target groups varied with distributional context, i.e., the
overall distribution of health in society. The relevant dis-
tributions are illustrated in Figure 1. While the variation
was modest, some differences can be seen. For example,
the group with an initial QALE of 10 was assigned the
same median weight in tasks A and E, but the mean
weight was slightly higher (0.16 units) in task E. One
possible explanation is that the worst off group stood
out more clearly in task E. For example, in that task
there was a much larger absolute and relative difference
between the worst off group and the adjacent group as
well as a larger difference between the worst off group
and the population average [28-30]. As for the group
with an initial QALE of 55, mean and median weights
were higher in task D (0.11 and 0.18 units) and task E
(0.16 and 0.18 units) than in task A. One possible ex-
planation is the variation in rank or relative position of
that group across tasks [28-30]. In task A, the group
with an initial QALE of 55 was next to the best off, while
in tasks D and E, that group was next to the worst off.
Overall, these findings suggest that the weights foundare quite robust across the distributional contexts ex-
plored. To the extent that there was some variation, this
indicates that different reasons for priority to the worse
off may be operating. This will be further discussed
below.
Discussion
The findings of this study shed light on lifetime QALY
prioritarianism with respect to both justification and
specification.
The findings suggest that both the greater benefit
principle and the worse off principle are important,
thereby providing basic support for prioritarianism. An ex-
clusive concern for health benefit maximization would
imply an indifference value of 10 QALYs—corresponding
to a distributive weight of 1—for every group. Only two
respondents reported such values in the main task. All
others found initial QALE relevant and were willing to
sacrifice some health benefits. More specifically, the find-
ings suggest that this concern for initial QALE mainly has
a prioritarian pattern, i.e., the value of a QALY decreases
monotonically with initial QALE. This pattern was exhib-
ited both by the sets of mean and median distributional
weights and by the majority of individual ranking patterns.
At the same time, the findings do not indicate an exclusive
concern for the worse off as only one respondent reported
the lowest possible indifference value (0.25 QALYs) for
any group. Overall, then, people seem to support both the
greater benefit and the worse off principles and appear
willing to trade off the two principles. This central trade-
off was further specified by distributive weights, which
express quantitatively the willingness to sacrifice total ben-
efits for the sake of benefiting the worse off. Weights of
this kind can help operationalize prioritarianism and pro-
vide input to CEA with weighted QALYs.
The main limitation of the study relates to the size and
composition of the sample used. The sample was relatively
small and involved only medical and dental students. The
findings thus need not be representative for the general
public in Norway or elsewhere. It is also worth noting that
lifetime QALY prioritarianism can be defended on several
fronts and that not all were addressed in the present study.
Our findings provided empirical support to lifetime QALY
prioritarianism primarily in two ways: by favoring a
principle sensitive to lifetime QALYs over pure QALY
maximization and by favoring a monotonically decreasing
priority pattern across initial lifetime QALYs over other
patterns. The findings do not, however, defend lifetime
QALY prioritarianism against every alternative specifica-
tion of prioritarianism. In particular, people may favor a
time-specific view over a lifetime view [16,17].
Another aspect of the responses to initial QALE is that
we cannot know exactly what factors respondents consid-
ered to be associated with QALE. While they were told
Figure 5 Mean and median distributional weights from the main task (A) and tasks D and E.
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apart from QALY gain and initial QALE, respondents may
have assumed, for example, that a low QALE is associated
with being disadvantaged also in other respects. As for
benefits, it is important to note that the tasks involved
fairly large health gains, i.e., at minimum 10 QALYs for at
least one group. This was done to ensure that the respon-
dents mainly dealt with benefits they considered signi-
ficant. At the same time, inferences from choices over
large benefits to claims about the relative importance of
marginal health gains must be made with care. One reason
is that nonmarginal benefits span several levels of health,
and the distributional concerns involved may deviate from
those related only to a marginal benefit [32]. In addition,
the value people assign to benefits appears to be nonlinear
in QALYs—possibly involving thresholds—in a way that
goes beyond concerns for initial level of health [36,37].
Accordingly, the distributive weights could have been
different if the reference value was of a different size.
For all studies eliciting stated judgments or prefer-
ences, it is also well known that responses can be highly
sensitive to minute details in presentation and framing
[38,39]. When designing the questionnaire, we therefore
paid much attention to how tasks and questions were
described. This effort included pilot sessions in which
respondents explained how they interpreted the ques-
tionnaire. Nevertheless, of those 86 respondents who
completed both task A and B, 20 (23%) did not meet
the inclusion criteria. Part of the explanation is probably
that in task A, lower indifference value implied higherimportance. It was indeed this feature that some pilot par-
ticipants found counterintuitive and that seemed to partly
explain why some of their direct rankings and implied
rankings conflicted. Both the preceding lecture and the
final questionnaire therefore put considerable effort in
making respondents aware of that property. The fact that
a highly educated sample still found the trade-offs so chal-
lenging suggests that certain adaptations would be needed
if the questionnaire was to be used with a sample of the
general public. Alternative modifications include a differ-
ent way of expressing trade-offs, use of less abstract inter-
ventions, use of face-to-face interview modes, and some
combination. The changes in responses across task B and
the identical task also highlight that people are unlikely to
have ready-made answers and that respondents should be
given considerable time for individual or group deliber-
ation [40,41].
Despite the limitations, the findings of this study can be
relevant in multiple ways. As with empirical ethics more
generally, the findings can help identify key moral issues
or make such issues more concrete. More specifically,
beyond the general findings discussed above, this study
highlighted at least three particularly challenging issues
for prioritarianism in priority setting as well as for priority
setting more generally. One issue was accentuated by the
interindividual variation in ranking patterns and the fun-
damental moral disagreements underlying mean and me-
dian weights. In such a situation, does it make sense to
use these weights for priority setting? This question calls
attention both to the aggregation of individual judgments
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tween empirical ethics and normative theory [14,22,23,42].
As for the latter, how can public opposition affect the the-
oretical case for a prioritarian pattern, the appropriateness
of that case guiding policy, or both? Conversely, how is
moral theory to constrain empirical ethics? It can be ar-
gued, for example, that public judgments should affect
priority setting only within some narrow confines set by
principled arguments. If so, one could ask whether the
prioritarian pattern is theoretically justified to the extent
that the role of empirical ethics is only to inform its slope.
This study also emphasized a particularly contentious
aspect of lifetime QALY prioritarianism: monotonically
decreasing priority at the very lower part of the QALE
scale. We compared groups with initial levels of QALE
of 10 and 25 in several ways and found considerable dis-
agreement. As described above, respondents were split
almost evenly on whether the former group should have
priority. Age is a major determinant of QALE, and the op-
position to prioritizing those with very low QALE plaus-
ibly derives from an unwillingness to prioritize the very
young. For example, a challenging case for lifetime QALY
prioritarianism with respect to age is the following. Two
terminally ill patients will gain 5 QALYs from intervention
and are similar in all possible respects but their age. One
patient is an infant; the other is 25 years old. If we can
treat only one, lifetime QALY prioritarianism favors the
infant, something which runs counter to intuitions com-
monly held according to some empirical studies [11,43].
Priority to adolescents and young adults over infants and
children also follows from certain theoretical frameworks
for priority setting [44] and from the age weighting that
previously underlay disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)
[45]. Moreover, several rationales for such priority have
been offered [19,27,43,45-47]. In light of this skepticism
toward priority to the very young, both in theory and
public opinion, priority with respect to very low levels of
QALE is a pressing challenge for priority setting and for
lifetime QALY prioritarianism in particular. The fact that
low QALE does not to need imply low expected age of
death, if quality is sufficiently low, makes the issue even
more complex and relevant for future empirical and
theoretical inquiry. In particular, it would be interesting to
understand how respondents reason when confronted
with initial health in terms of a certain level of QALE.
What do they assume is the relative contribution of qual-
ity and quantity to that construct, and how do they subse-
quently apply their view about the relative importance of
the two?
Another important issue was highlighted by the modest,
yet palpable variation in weights across distributional con-
texts: the issue of reasons for priority to the worse off.
Some, including Parfit, deem necessary for prioritarianism
that the worse off have priority because they are at a lowerabsolute level. However, many other, partly overlapping
reasons exist [9,13,26,28,30,48]. A key distinction is that
between reasons that are directly relational and those that
are not [9,13]. Central among the latter is the reason just
mentioned: that the worse off are at lower absolute level
[13]. In contrast, relational reasons—of which egalitarian
reasons are typically considered a subset—are concerned
with how people fare relative to others. Potentially rele-
vant relations include rank or relative position, absolute
difference, and relative difference or ratio [28-30].
Despite Parfit’s emphasis on absolute level, some broader
conceptions of prioritarianism allow for a variety of rea-
sons to motivate priority to the worse off. Such a con-
ception is particularly useful when prioritarianism is
contrasted with the sole operation of the greater benefit
principle or pure health maximization. Given a broad con-
ception of prioritarianism, variation in distributive weights
across distributional contexts also becomes more inte-
resting. While the variation in this study was modest, the
variation found allows for some hypotheses based on the-
oretical work [28-30]. The variation across tasks A and E,
for example, suggests that even for a given absolute level
of QALE, priority to the worse off group will vary with the
group’s absolute and relative difference from other groups
in society. Moreover, the difference between task A versus
tasks D and E indicates that also relative position or rank
can change priorities independent of absolute QALE level.
Overall, the modest variation suggests that distributive
weights can be quite robust across distributional contexts
and that absolute level of QALE may be the dominant rea-
son for priority to the worse off. Both this hypothesis and
the variation across contexts need to be further examined,
and this calls for more research into what reasons drive
people’s concern for the worse off in health.
Conclusions
The present study used a new, comprehensive question-
naire to assess people’s support for lifetime QALY priori-
tarianism and to quantify how they trade off QALYs
gained against benefiting those with low initial QALE. In
addition, the study carefully examined the links between
the findings and normative theory.
Support for lifetime prioritarianism was found in mean
and median weights as well as in individual ranking pat-
terns, and we calculated distributional weights of a kind
that can make prioritarianism more operational and pro-
vide input to non-standard CEA. When applying the
lens of normative theory, several challenges to lifetime
QALY prioritarianism became apparent. These concern
the aggregation of weights across conflicting ranking
patterns, priorities with respect to low QALE levels, and
the relevance of distributional context. These challenges
are important topics for future empirical as well as the-
oretical research.
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dents restricts direct policy recommendations. However,
the findings of this study add to the evidence that pure
QALY maximization and standard CEA with QALYs are
insufficient bases for priority setting—this time in the
context of lifetime health. The findings should encour-
age researchers as well as policy makers to pay more at-
tention to lifetime QALY prioritarianism. The study also
indicates how people specifically want to balance the
concerns for QALYs gained and initial QALE, but larger
and more representative studies are certainly needed.
When the appropriate balance is better established, the
difference between pure QALY maximization and life-
time QALY prioritarianism will also stand out more
clearly.
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